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Although AVHs are classified as a first-rank symptom of schizo-
phrenia, they may not necessarily signify pathology and may best
be understood within the wider context of the development of
inner speech (Jones & Fernyhough 2007a; 2007b). In Vygotsky’s
theory of the social origins of higher mental processes, inner
speech represents the end point of a developmental process in
which external conversation gradually becomes internalized to
form verbal thought (Vygotsky 1934/1987). Like its semi-covert
developmental precursor, private speech, inner speech retains
the dialogic nature of the external discourse from which it
derives. Fernyhough’s four-stage model of the development of
inner speech as conceptualized by Vygotsky suggests two distinct
forms of dialogic inner speech (Fernyhough 2004): expanded
inner speech, where the give-and-take quality of external conver-
sation permeates the verbal mentation; and a condensed variety
of inner speech, where inner speech becomes “thinking in pure
meanings” (Vygotsky 1934/1987), having lost most of the acous-
tics and structure of external dialogue. According to Ferny-
hough’s (2004) theory of AVHs, which draws on Vygotskian
ideas about the developmental significance of inner speech,
AVHs result from the temporary re-expansion of condensed
inner speech, particularly under conditions of stress and cogni-
tive challenge. The acoustic properties of the voices in inner dia-
logue are thus not attenuated but are experienced fully. The
question then is how it is possible that cognition (inner voice)
produced by self may be experienced as produced by other.
The cognitive dysfunction that results in the failure to differen-
tiate self from other in inner speech may be explained by a
forward model similar to the one underpinning Hurley’s layer
2. SCM relies on the forward model of motor control as proposed
by Miall (2003) to postulate the subpersonal process that predicts
the consequences of motor commands and compares them with
the desired state. In her article on delusions of alien control, Bla-
kemore (2003) uses this model to explain how an internal predic-
tor uses information about intentions to enable the distinction
between self-generated and externally generated sensory
events. The forward model is dysfunctional when it cannot accu-
rately predict the sensory consequences of a movement based on
the efference copy of the motor command. This results in sensory
discrepancy and a failure to cancel the reafference or actual feed-
back, so that the self-produced movement feels externally caused
(Blakemore 2003; see also Frith et al. 2000b). Although devel-
oped to explain abnormalities involving overt actions, this
forward model has recently been applied to inner speech
(Jones & Fernyhough 2007b). Jones and Fernyhough’s appli-
cation proposes a direct causal mechanism leading from a mal-
function of the predicted state to the experience of inner
speech as being of alien origin. When the brain either produces
a degraded predicted state or fails to produce a predicted state at
all from the initial inner speech motor command, the conse-
quence is that an emotion of self-authorship is not felt and
instead the inner speech is experienced as authored by an other.
For any model of the mind or cognitive functioning to be com-
plete, it must relate to the brain. Thus, we need to understand the
neural underpinnings of the predicted-state mechanism pro-
posed by the forward model. This may require investigating net-
works, such as the interactions between perceptual and motor
areas (Jones & Fernyhough 2007b). For example, Leube et al.
(2003) have suggested that neurological activity associated with
a deficit in the efference copy mechanism may involve the corti-
cal network that de Vignemont and Fourneret (2004) found
implicated in action attribution, including the prefrontal and
the parietal cortex, the supplementary motor area, and the cer-
ebellum. In terms of AVHs, Shergill et al. (2000) examined func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of patients with
schizophrenia made while the patients were experiencing AVHs.
They noted that the pattern of activation observed during AVHs
was remarkably similar to that seen when healthy volunteers
engaged in auditory verbal imagery (AVI), which is produced
when one imagines being spoken to by another person.
Specifically, Shergill et al. (2000) observed common activation
of bilateral frontal and temporal gyri, along with right-sided pre-
central and inferior parietal gyri. Increased supplementary motor
area activation was associated with healthy participants generat-
ing auditory verbal images; however, the supplementary motor
area (SMA) was only weakly activated during AVHs. Other
studies have suggested a role for the right anterior cingulate
gyrus (see Jones & Fernyhough 2007a and studies cited
therein). Given that the parietal and cingulate cortices subserve
attention to internal and external bodily space and the attribution
of significance to sensory information, they provide a plausible
neural substrate for the misattribution of self-generated inner
speech to other (see Spence et al. 1997).
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Abstract: The target article says surprisingly little about the possible role
of shared circuits in language and communication. This commentary
considers how they might contribute to linguistic communication,
particularly during dialogue. We argue that shared circuits are used to
promote alignment between linguistic representations at many levels
and to support production-based emulation of linguistic input during
comprehension.
Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM) provides a framework for
investigating the role of emulation and imitation in social cogni-
tion. The SCM builds on two recent developments in cognitive
neuroscience: Grush’s (2004) notion of an emulator (originating
from motor control theory) and the discovery of mirror and cano-
nical neurons in monkeys. The target article specifically concen-
trates on the role of shared circuits in imitation, deliberation, and
mindreading. However, it says little about their role in language
and communication, which presumably underpin many of the
cognitive abilities that Hurley focuses on.
Section 2.3.1 of the target article discusses various hypotheses
about how imitation might support language. For example,
Hurley argues that the “flexible articulated relations between
means and ends in imitative learning could be an evolutionary
precursor of arbitrary relations between symbols and referents”
(para. 2) and that “mirror systems provide a common code for
actions of self and other, and thus for language production and
perception” (para. 3). Finally, she suggests that the “flexible
recombinant structure of ends and means in imitation may be a
precursor of recombinant grammatical structure in language”
(para. 4).
However, section 3 contains surprisingly little about the
relationship between the SCM (and its various layers) and
language processing. In fact, it is only when discussing layer 5
(the full-blown model) that language is considered at all. This
is in relation to how imitative learning together with learned
manipulation of external symbols could support the rich struc-
ture of language. Hurley also speculates that language could
assist layer 5 circuits in taking input off-line, thereby allowing
for more advanced mindreading (e.g., in multi-person strategic
deliberation).
By contrast, we suggest that lower layers of the SCM may play
a crucial role in language processing, in particular during
Commentary/Hurley: The shared circuits model
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interactive dialogue, which is the most basic setting for linguistic
communication. Notice that some of the strongest evidence for
perception priming action is from the language domain. For
example, there are now a number of demonstrations of the
priming of articulators during speech perception using transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electromyography (EMG)
(Fadiga et al. 2002; Watkins et al. 2003). We have argued that,
during dialogue, interlocutors tend to align their mental states
at many levels, and that such alignment is largely a result of
priming (Pickering & Garrod 2004). Indeed, successful com-
munication appears to occur when interlocutors align their
models of the situation under discussion. So it would be surpris-
ing if the “shared circuits” underlying imitation and mindreading
did not also play an important role in this process. In fact, good
evidence suggests that alignment of the situation model is sup-
ported by rapid and largely automatic alignment at many linguis-
tic levels, such as sound (e.g., Pardo 2006), syntax (Branigan et al.
2000), and meaning of expressions (Garrod & Anderson 1987).
Such linguistic priming would arise at layer 3 of the SCM, just as
it does for the chameleon effect (Chartrand&Bargh 1999). Hurley
notes “the intimate relationship between the sharing of circuits for
self and other and for action and perception: Layer 3’s shared
informational dynamics for intersubjectivity presupposes layer
2’s shared informational dynamics for perception and action”
(sect. 3.3, para. 3). We argue that just such a relationship holds
between shared circuits for linguistic representations in communi-
cators and shared informational dynamics for language production
and comprehension (Garrod & Pickering 2004). In other words,
covert and overt imitation (i.e., imitative production) at various lin-
guistic levels promotes alignment or intersubjectivity between lin-
guistic representations at those levels.
It is not only in relation to imitation that dialogue processing
involves shared circuits. There is increasing evidence that
language comprehension like action observation may use
production-based (i.e., action based) emulation. In particular, we
have argued that comprehension uses predictions based on simul-
taneous involvement of components of the language production
system in the form of a Grush-style emulator (Pickering &
Garrod 2007). Such an emulator uses the production system to
make predictions (at various linguistic levels) about the input to
the comprehension system and runs those predictions in real
time. In this way, the system facilitates rapid interpretation and is
robust in dealing with ambiguous or noisy language input. At the
same time, by priming the production system, the emulator facili-
tates the rapid switching between comprehension and production
during dialogue. Although this production-based emulator is used
for comprehending speech, it is built out of exactly the same action-
perception components as used in layer 3 of the SCM.
Incorporating control systems into shared circuits for social
cognition is a welcome theoretical development. Here we have
argued that such shared circuits can also be used to explain
how interlocutors align their linguistic representations during
dialogue, which ultimately supports successful communication.
Indeed, communication is about sharing (with the Latin commu-
nicare meaning “to share” or “to make common”), so it should
come as no surprise that linguistic communication depends
upon shared circuits.
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Abstract: Hurley’s high level of generality suggests that a control-
theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question,
but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain,
where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no
evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions,
such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational
mindreading are also found.
Hurley’s target article is pitched at a high level of generality.
It speaks broadly of shared circuits, control, mirroring, simu-
lation, mindreading, and so forth, giving the impression that its
major theses apply equally across all applicable types of cogni-
tion. But there is good reason to doubt that this is accurate,
and it is not entirely clear whether Hurley really intends it.
Important sub-themes of the target article seem principally
aimed at the relation between action and perception – for
example, the falsity of the “classical sandwich architecture”
(sect. 3, para. 1). Is everything she says about action, perception,
and feedback supposed to apply equally to other domains in
which shared circuits, mirroring, and mindreading are found?
The article’s level of abstraction leaves the distinct impression
that the theses advanced at the various layers of analysis cut
across all the domains, but that is dubious.
My chief worry centers on the relation between shared circuits
(or mirroring) and control theory. Hurley is not alone in empha-
sizing such a connection (Gallese 2003; Wolpert et al. 2003).
However, the case for tying the control-theoretic perspective to
shared circuits, mirroring, and simulation is based mainly on
the action-perception domain, where there is specific physiologi-
cal, theoretical, and experimental evidence for efferent copy and
reafferent input. Nothing of this sort exists, however, for a
number of other domains where shared circuits and simulation
are found.
To be specific, mirroring phenomena exist in several areas of
cognition in addition to the motoric: in sensation, including
pain (Jackson et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2004) and touch
(Keysers et al. 2004), and in emotion (most clearly, disgust; see
Wicker et al. 2003). But in these domains, there are no estab-
lished feedback or control-theoretic phenomena of comparable
importance – or any sort at all. Here is a brief review of the
shared circuits (or mirroring) findings across multiple domains.
The shared areas or circuits for action are the premotor cortex
and inferior parietal lobule interconnected with the superior
temporal sulcus (STS)/middle temporal gyrus (MTG); for
disgust, the insula; for fear, (possibly) the amygdala; for pain,
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula; and for
touch, the somatosensory cortices. In all cases, observing what
other people do or feel is transformed into an inner represen-
tation of what we would do or feel in a similar, endogenously pro-
duced, situation. In many of these cases, moreover, evidence
drawn from lesion studies and imaging studies indicates that mir-
roring produces mindreading of others’ mental states (Goldman
2006; in press; Goldman & Sripada 2005). However, only in the
case of action is there clear evidence of feedback loops that fit the
control-theoretic framework. So the notion that systematic
relationships between shared circuits, simulation, and mindread-
ing crucially depend on control-theoretic mechanisms is unsup-
ported. Yet that is what Hurley suggests, since her architecture
of social cognition is erected on a control-theoretic foundation.
Hurley writes that “the shared circuits model (SCM) shows how
subpersonal resources for control, mirroring, and simulation can
enable the distinctively human sociocognitive skills of imitation,
deliberation, and mindreading” (sect. 3, para. 1). Her two
bottom layers of analysis highlight adaptive feedback control and
prediction of effects for improved control, and the three higher
layers are explained in terms of these lower-level mechanisms.
She makes no attempt, however, to explain how feedback and
control account for simulational, empathic, or mindreading prop-
erties related to sensation and emotion. Indeed, the latter
are barely mentioned. The explananda listed at her top level, the
personal-animal level, all involve action and behavior; yet the
Commentary/Hurley: The shared circuits model
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